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NOTES, COMMENTS AND DIGESTS
ZONING-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ZONING LAWS ENACTED
TO PROTECT AIRPORT APPROACHES.
The great strides made by commercial aviation during the last generation,
the huge expansion of the country's capacity to manufacture aircraft which
has been necessitated by the war effort, and the growing interest in private
flying, all have combined recently to press home the problems created by the
increased use of aircraft. One of the most important problems has been that of
protecting approaches to landing fields in order to insure the safe arrival and
departure of aircraft. The laws of physics decree that a certain minimum
gliding angle be maintained while an airplane approaches the ground for a
landing. The hope expressed in the early part of the last decade that the use
of helicopter airplanes would permit the use of very small landing fields has,
as yet, not been realized; and instead, the use of larger aircraft has considerably
increased the space needed for safe landing and departure. Authorities now
recommend that a gliding angle of 40:1 (forty feet in horizontal distance for
every foot of height) be available at Class A airports.
It would be possible to protect the approaches to an airport by purchasing
all of the land surrounding the airport, or by purchasing an easement over such
lands. Although the right of eminent domain has been extended to airport
companies in California,1 the use of this method would not be practicable in
many instances because of the great expense that would necessarily be involved.
The solution to the problem that has presented itself in the most favorable light
to the aviation industry has been the adoption of zoning laws which would
restrict the height of structures in the vicinity of airports, and it is this solution
that will be here discussed.
The validity of zoning laws enacted under the police power of the State
has now been generally recognized.2 The question presented by the enactment of
all zoning laws, however, is whether they are a valid exercise of the police
power. It is generally urged by those adversely affected by zoning laws that
1. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (1941), §1238: "Subject to the provisions of this title,
the right of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the following public
uses: . . . (20) Airports for the landing and taking off of aircraft, and for the
construction and maintenance of hangars, mooring masts, flying fields, signal
lights and radio equipment." This section is to be construed in connection with
Cal. Civ. Code (1941), §1001, which provides: "Any person may, without further
legislative action, acquire private property for any use specified in section twelve
hundred and thirty-eight of the Code of Civil Procedure either by consent of the
owner or by proceedings had under the provisions of title seven, part three, of the
Code of Civil Procedure; and any person seeking to acquire property for any
of the uses mentioned in such title, is 'an agent of the state,' or a 'person in
charge of such use,' within the meaning of those terms as used in such title . . . "
"The right to condemn may be exercised by the state through its Immediate
officers or it may be delegated through legislative acts to corporate bbdies or
Individuals upon compliance with the terms on which the right is given." 10 Cal.
Jur., Eminent Domain (1923), 289, §8, and cases there cited.
2. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394, 36 Sup. Ct. 143, 60 L. Ed. 348, Ann.
Cas. 1917B 927 (1915) ; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 366,
47 Sup. Ct. 114 71 L. Ed. 303, 54 A.L.R. 1016 (1926) ; Miller v. Board of Public
Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381, 38 A.L.R. 1479 (1925) ; Zahn v. Board of
Public Works, 195 Cal. 497, 234 Pac. 388 (1925), affd., 274 U. S. 325, 47 Sup. Ct.
594, 71 L. Ed. 1074 (1927).
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the restrictions placed upon the use of property constitute an unreasonable inter-
ference with rights of property, or that such laws deprive property owners of
"due process of law" or the "equal protection of the laws"! On the other hand,
it is recognized that the States, under the police power, may enact statutes
which have a reasonable tendency to promote the public health, safety or morals,
or to promote the general welfare.4 Can it properly be said, therefore, that a
zoning law which would restrict the use of property surrounding airports so
that such property could not be utilized in a manner which would make hazardous
the use of the airports and endanger the lives and property or people in the
vicinity of airports, is a valid exercise of the police power? The answer to this
question must depend upon the degree of foresight exercised by the courts in
construing such zoning laws, and the drafting of the laws themselves in a manner
which will adequately protect the owners of property which would be affected by
such laws.
The objection that a zoning act limiting the height of structures erected
upon property surrounding airports deprives the surrounding property owners of
equal protection of the laws is an objection that has been urged as to many
zoning laws.' Every zoning act must, by necessity, operate arbitrarily to a
certain extent; but, in those jurisdictions which have upheld the validity of
zoning laws, the courts have pointed out that the fixing of zones is a matter
within the discretion of the public authorities.' In the absence of proof of a
clear abuse of the discretion vested in the public authorities, the courts will not
substitute their judgment for that of the proper administrative officials.7
A zoning law enacted to protect airport approaches should be made, preferably,
a part of a master zoning plan whereby definite areas would be set aside in
which the operation of airports would be permitted. 'The adoption of such a
master plan would still further remove the force of arguments that the
restriction of the height of structures surrounding airports is arbitrary.
A still more serious problem, however, is presented by the claim that a
zoning law protecting airport approaches would deprive surrounding property
owners of their property in violation of the "due process" clauses of the state
and federal constitutions. Insofar as any zoning law depreciates the value of
property by restricting the use to which it may be put, every such law results
in the taking of private property without compensation. It has been held,
however, that the rights of property ownership are held subject to a valid
exercise of the police power by the State, and incidental damage to property
resulting from proper governmental activities is not a deprivation of property
without due process of law.8 Both the California and United States Supreme
3. 3 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. 1928), 350, §1043.
4. Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501, 24 L. Ed. 1115 (1878) ; Barbier v.
Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357, 28 L. Ed. 923 (1885) ; Terrace v. Thompson,
263 U. S. 197, 44 Sup. Ct. 15, 68L. Ed. 255 (1923).
5. See, for example: Zahn v. Board of Public'Works, 274 U. S. 325, 47 Sup.
Ct. 594, 71 L. Ed. 1074 (1927) ; State ex. rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154
La. 271, 97 So. 440, 33 A.L.R. 260 (1923) ; State ex rel. Manhein v. Harrison, 164
La. 564, 114 So. 159 (1927).
6. Brown v. City of Los Angeles, 183 Cal. 783, 192 Pac. 716 (1920) ; Miller
v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381, 38 A.L.R. 1479 (1925) ;
Sunny Slope Water Co. v. City of Pasadena, 1 Cal. (2d) 87, 33 Pac. (2d) 672
1934) ; Acker v. Baldwin, 18 Adv. Cal. 323, 115 Pac. (2d) 455 (1941).
7. For cases holding that there was an abuse of discretion, see: Skalko v.
City of Sunnyvale, 14 Cal. (2d) 213, 93 Pac. (2d) 93 (1939); Arverne Bay
Construction Co. v, Thatcher, 278 N. Y. 222, 15 N. E. (2d) 587, 117 A.L.R.
1110 (1938).
8. This doctrine was well stated in State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis.
148, 154, 196 N. W. 451, 453, 33 A.L.R. 269, 273 (1923), where it was said:
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Courts have upheld zoning laws even though such laws resulted in great
financial loss to individual property owners.' It would seem, therefore, that the
validity of a zoning act calculated to protect airport approaches must depend,
in its final analysis, upon whether the law is a valid exercise of the policy
power and not upon its effect in reducing the value of the property affected.
Limitations upon the height of buildings are not uncommon, and these
laws generally have been upheld as a valid exercise of the police power to
reduce the fire hazard in centers of population."0 Even where it has been quite
evident that the law was enacted to accomplish some purposes not strictly within
the police power, the courts have upheld the validity of such laws if they
actually did serve some legitimate police purpose." It would seem, therefore,
that if a zoning law such as that under consideration here served an end
recognized as a proper object of protection under the police power, the courts
would not inquire as to whether any other purpose was being accomplished
which could not form the sole subject of such a statute. At least one zoning
statute enacted to protect airport approaches has attempted to show that the law
was enacted as a proper exercise of the police power in that it was calculated to
protect the public safety. 2
A statute enacted under the police power must operate for the benefit of
the general public." It has been held that a zoning law restricting the height
"It is thoroughly established in this country that the rights preserved to the
individual by these constitutional provisions are held in subordination to the
rights of society. Although one owns property, he may not do with it as he
pleases, any more than he may act in accordance with his personal desires. As
the interest of society justifies restraints upon the individual conduct, so also
does it justify restraints upon the use to which property may be devoted. It was
not intended by these constitutional provisions to so far protect the individual in
the use of his -property as to enable him to use it to the detriment of society.
By thus protecting individual rights, society did not part with the power to
protect itself or to promote its general well-being. Where the interest of the
individual conflicts with the interests of society, such individual interest is
subordinated to the general welfare. If in the prosecution of governmental func-
tions it becomes necessary to take private property, compensation must be made.
But incidental damages to property resulting from governmental activities, or
laws passed in the promotion of the public welfare, are not considered a taking
of the property for which compensation must be made." Accord: Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R. RI. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 17 Sup. Ct. 581, 41 L. Ed.
979 (1897) : Chicago & Alton R. R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67, 35 Sup. Ct. 678,
59 L. Ed. 1201 (19115).
9. In Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394, 36 Sup. Ct. 143, G0 L. Ed. 348,
Ann. Cas. 1917B 927 (1915), affg. 165 Cal. 416, 132 Pac. 584, L.R.A. 1916B 1248(1913), the property owner had established a brick kiln in a certain district
within the city of Los Angeles prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance
prohibiting the operation of brick kilns in such district. The ordinance was upheld
although it served to reduce the value of the property from $800,000 to $60,000.
10. Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91, 29 Sup. Ct. 567, 53 L. Ed. 923 (1909),
affg. 193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E. 745, 23 L.R.A. N. S. 1160, 118 Am. St. Rep.
523 (1907) ; Cochran v. Preston, 108 Md. 220, 70 At. 113, 23 L.R.A. (N. S.]
1163, 129 Am. St. Rep. 432, 15 Ann. Cas. 1048 (1908); in re Opinion of the
Justices, 234 Mass. 597, 127 N. E. 525 (1920) ; Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams
Building Corp., 229 N. Y. 313, 128 N. E. 209 (1920) ; Atkinson v. Piper, 181 Wis.
519, 195 N. W. 544 (1923).
11. Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91, 29 Sup. Ct. 567, 53 L. Ed. 923 (1909)
Cochran v. Preston, 108 Md. 220, 70 AtI. 113, 23 L.R.A. N. S. 1163, 129 Am.
St. Rep. 432, 15 Ann. Cas. 1048 (1908); Atkinson v. Piper, 181 Wis. 519, 195
N. W. 544 (1923). In connection with the last cited case, reference should be
made to Piper v. Ekern, 180 Wis. 586, 194 N. W. 159, 34 A.L.R. 32 (1923), in which
a statute limiting the height of structures which was passed ostensibly for the
purpose of reducing the fire hazard to the state capitol building was held un-
constitutional.
12. Me. Laws (1941), c. 142 [1941] U. S. Av. R. 451. It is there stated, in
§2: "It Is hereby found and declared that an airport hazard endangers the lives
and property of users of the airport and of occupants in its vicinity . . . ";
and see the discussion of this statute in Municipalities and The Law in Action
In 1941, p. 579.
13. Lawton v. Steel, 152 U. S. 133, 14 Sup. Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed. 395 (1894).
NOTES, COMMENTS AND DIGESTS
of structures surrounding airports is for the benefit of those desiring to use
aerial transportation and for those who use airports rather than for the general
public." On the other hand, it has been contended that the general public is
benefited by the presence of facilities which enable the community to utilize
a most important form of transportation."5 The importance to the general
public of airport facilities is shown by a number of decisions holding an airport
to be a public utility and the operation of an airport to be a public purpose, so
that municipalities could acquire and maintain airports." The importance of
airport facilities to the progressive community was judicially recognized as far
back as 1928 by Mr. Justice Cardozo when he said:
"A city acts for municipal purposes when it builds a dock or bridge
or a street or a subway. Its purpose is not different when it builds an
airport. Aviation today is an established means of transportation. The
future, even the near future, will make it still more general. The city
that is without the foresight to build the ports for the new traffic may
soon be left far behind in the race of competition. Chalcedon was called
the city of the blind, because its founders rejected the nobler site of
Byzantium lying at their feet. The need for vision of the future in the
governance of cities has not lessened with the years. The dweller within
the gates, even more than the stranger from afar, will pay the price of
blindness."'"
Predictions are now being freely made that the airplane will supplant the
automobile to a considerable extent after the end of the present conflict, because
of the great expansion of the country's aircraft manufacturing capacity and
the development of small aircraft which are safe to fly and inexpensive to
produce and operate.' 8 That these predictions have been partially realized is
shown by the constant increase in the number of persons licensed to fly airplanes
and the accompanying increase in the number of privately owned aircraft. 19
It would seem, therefore, that the protection of aerial terminal facilities, if not
yet a matter affecting the general public, is speedily approaching the point
where it will be a matter of general public interest, and that to insure the
uninterrupted progress of aerial transportation, effective steps should be taken
now to protect airport approaches.2"
14. Mutual Chemical Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, [1939]
U. S. Av. R. 11 (Md. C. C. Bait. 1939), discussed in 10 Air L. Rev. 312 (1939)
10 Jour. Air L. & Com. 424 (1939).
15. Notes: 10 Air L. Rev. 312 (1939) ; 10 Jour. Air. L. & Com. 424 (1939).
16. Krenwinkle v. City of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. (2d) 611, 51 Pac. (2d) 1098(1935) State ex rel. City of Lincoln v. Johnson, 117 Neb. 301, 220 N. W. 273
(1928) State ex rel. Chandler v. Jackson, 121 Ohio St. 186, 167 N. E. 396 (1929).
17. Hesse v. Rath, 249 N. Y. 436, 164 N. E. 342 (1928).
18. Eddie Rickenbacker Looks Ahead, 23 Fortune (1941), 118.
19. The number of certificated pilots in the United States on January 1,
1942, was 100,787, an increase of 59.7% over the number of certificated pilots on
January 1, 1941, and an increase of 338.51% over the 22,983 certificated pilots on
January 1, 1939. During the year ending January 1, 1942, the number of cer-
tificated aircraft increased 43% to 24,836. The importance of aerial transportation
In California is emphasized by the fact that this State, on January 1, 1942, led
in the number of certificated pilots, with 12,053 as compared to New York's
7,395 which was next in line. California also led in the number of certificated
aircraft, with 2,404, as compared with Pennsylvania's 2,357 which was the second
largest number among the States. 3 Civil Aeronautics Jour. 45, 48 (1942).
20. During the year ending January 1, 1942, there was an increase in the
number of airports and landing fields throughout the United States of 328, to
bring the total number up to 2,484. Texas led all the States in the number of
airports and landing fields with a total of 207, while California was next with
194. 3 Civil Aeronautics Jour. 22 (1942).
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Legislation to protect airport approaches extends back at least to 1928,21
and in the past two years there has been enacted a rapidly increasing volume of
such legislation "2 with new laws being constantly proposed.2 The statutes that
have been enacted do not attempt, in many cases, to set out a comprehensive
solution of the airport approach problem, and in all of the statutes the efforts
of the draftsmen to meet anticipated constitutional objections is evident. Many
of the statutes are made applicable only to publicly owned airports, 4 but it is
submitted that the problem as to what airports should be protected is best
covered by the Arkansas statute.2" The Arkansas zoning law applies to airports
of the "public utility class," and airports are placed within that class if they
are available to the general public for private flying, or as a point of arrival or
departure by air.2"
Practically all of the zoning statutes deal in the same general way with the
problem of nonconforming uses. Nonconforming uses may be abated by com-
pensating the owner for the injury to his property that would be caused by
altering any structure to make it conform to the provisions of the statute.
To provide for the gradual elimination of all nonconforming uses, it is generally
provided that no nonconforming structure may be altered in any way to make
the structure any greater hazard to aerial navigation than it already is. If
the structure has deteriorated to a substantial extent-generally between 50%
to 80%-it is provided that such structure may not be rebuilt and that the owner
may be required to tear it down. This provision applies whether the deterioration
occurs because of gradual decay or because of some unforseen event such as an
act of God. It has been pointed out that the courts have generally upheld such
provisions in zoning laws.2"
The advisability of protecting airport approaches would not be disputed by
many, but the methods by which this should be done will doubtlessly provoke
serious dispute. The only methods proposed whereby airport approaches could
be effectively protected are condemnation of the land surrounding the airport or
condemnation of an easement over such lands, and the enactment of comprehen-
sive zoning laws which would restrict the use of property around airports without
providing for compensation to landowners except in those cases where it is
21. The County of Alameda, California, on December 3, 1928, adopted an
ordinance which declared it to be unlawful to erect any structure whatever in
excess of 50 feet in height within 1000 feet of any boundary of a public air
navigation facility. The Board of Port Commissioners of the City of Oakland,
California, adopted a similar measure on January 7, 1929. 2 Air Com. Bull.
333, 334 (1930).
22. Eleven acts were adopted during 1941 to provide for airport zoning.
This brought to 23 the number of States having legislation on this subject. 2
Civil Aeronautics Jour. 313, 332 (1941).
23. See, for example, the Model Airport Zoning Act drafted by the Civil
Aeronautice Administration, and the Model Airport Zoning Act drafted by the
National Institute of Municipal Law Officers. 12 Jour. Air L. & Com. 176, 182
(1941).
24. Among the statutes of this type are the following: Idaho Laws (1939),
No. 308, [1939] U. S. Av. R. 394 ; Il1. Laws (1941), S. B. 493, [1941] U. S. Av. R.
408, Mass. Laws (1941), c. 537, [1941] U. S. Av. R. 469; Mont. Laws (1939), c. 12,
[1939] U. S. Av. R. 450; N. M. Laws (1941), c. 171, [1941] U. S. Av. R. 521 ; Ore.
Laws (1941), c. 265, [1941] U. S. Av. R. 556.
25. Ark. Laws (1941), Act. 116, [1941] U. S. Av. R. 334.
26. Maine and North Carolina have adopted airport zoning laws which are
applicable to any airport. Such a provision would seem to include airports
which are not open to the general public, and, as a result, it seems doubtful as to
whether a zoning law as applied to such airports could be upheld as a proper
excercise of the police power. Me. Laws (1941), c. 142, [1941] U. S. Av. R. 451;
N. C. Laws (1941), c. 250, [1941] U. S. Av. R. 534.
27. Comment, 35 Mich. L. Rev. 642 (1937).
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sought to abate a nonconforming use. The adoption of the condemnation method
would protect the interests of property owners to the greatest possible extent,
but the financial burden upon both municipal and private operators of airports
would probably be so great in certain cases that the proper protection could
not be realized. The enactment of zoning laws would transfer the burden from
the operators of airports to the owners of the property surrounding the airports.
Whether or not this could properly be done without violating the constitutional
guarantees pertaining to the rights of property ownership depends upon whether
such laws could be properly brought within the exercise of the police power
as a means of protecting the public safety or promoting the general welfare
because the rights of property owners are subject to the interests of the general
public. If the narrow view is taken that the protection of airport approaches is
for the benefit only of those who use the airport and the owners of such airports,
then the constitutional objections must prevail. If, on the other hand, it is
recognized that the unhindered development of aerial transportation will operate
to the benefit of all members of the community, and that the proper development
of air terminals today is as important as was the development of railway
terminals during the last century, it is submitted that the enactment of zoning
laws for the protection of airport approaches is a proper exercise of the police
power, and the constitutional objections must fail.-IRvIN GRANT.
